don of Pennoyer's worst defects by improvisation, all played a part. But most important is the fact that the inertia of the Pennoyer system has never been challenged by the appearance of an acceptable alternative. 3 The principal components of a jurisdictional theory strong enough to displace Pennoyer are to be found in the "minimum contacts" approach of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 4 But no such theory has yet been constructed out of those components. The reasons why International Shoe has not been thus developed seem to be three. First, the minimum-contacts approach was itself associated only with in personam jurisdiction and had no apparent relevance to jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem. A general theory such as Pennoyer's is not displaced by one of merely special application. Second, there seemed to be no satisfactory method of establishing limits on state-court jurisdiction if the minimum-contacts approach were applied generally. Limits were felt difficult enough to devise in the application of minimum-contacts analysis to in personam cases, 6 and that could be regarded as justification not to borrow trouble by extension of the analysis to other types of cases. The vagaries of property situs that had emerged in the state taxation cases also warned against introducing similarly unpredictable flexibility into the rules of jurisdiction in rem."
In a 5 to 4 decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren reached the fair result, in favor of the executrix daughter, but by a line of analysis that in all charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow, no less to relate. The Court held that Florida had neither jurisdiction in rem over the trust nor jurisdiction in personam over the trustee; that Delaware had jurisdiction because the trust corpus was within its territory. The difficulties in the opinion include at least the following: (1) Why was the dispute about the trust corpus, rather than the decedent's estate? The question was whether certain stock should be assigned to the trust corpus or to the decedent's estate; to assume it was a trust case was to assume the question in issue. (2) Why were not the "contacts" of the Delaware trustee-who had maintained an extended correspondence with the decedent-with Florida enough to satisfy the minimum required by International Shoe to establish in personam jurisdiction? The Court said that the trustee had not "performed any acts in Florida" but in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,' 0 a mail order insurance business had been held subject to jurisdiction in the state of residence of a policy beneficiary. (3) Why was it not sufficient that the Florida court had before it all those beneficially interested in the property, whether or not the Delaware trustee was also subject to jurisdiction?
These are not difficulties of decisional technique. They are intractabilities in the conceptual components of decision. As I shall develop more fully, I think it is impossible consistently to apply Pennoyer and International Shoe. Hanson v. Denckla, in its futile attempt to accommodate both, reveals the depth of the doctrinal chasm between them.
After Hanson v. Denckla the Supreme Court did not again struggle with the Pennoyer problem"l until last Term when it decided two cases that subject the Pennoyer conceptual structure to further stress and, at the same time, contain useful bases for erecting a new structure. These were United States v. First National City Bank 2 and Texas v. New Jersey. 8 The Citibank case involved the issuance of an injunction by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the First National City Bank, whose headquarters are in Manhattan, that temporarily restrained the bank from honoring withdrawals of funds that had been deposited at its Montevideo, Uruguay, office by a Uruguayan corporation which allegedly owed income tax to the Government. Texas v. New Jersey involved claims of escheat by Texas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and other states against funds held by the Sun Oil Co., a New Jersey corporation with headquarters in Philadelphia, the funds being the product of transactions in Texas with persons who were, inter alia, Floridians.
What the Court decided in these two cases, and how it reached decision, seems useful, interesting, and supportive of a theory of jurisdiction that can displace Pennoyer. I will suggest such a theory in these pages, and in the process indicate the relevance of the two new cases to the general problem of jurisdiction. I will proceed by the following steps: first, observations on the historical setting of Pennoyer itself; second, consideration of the rationale in Pennoyer; third, review of some of the practical and conceptual difficulties created by the Pennoyer rationale; and, finally, suggestions for a different approach.
I. PENNOYEtR IN HIsToRIcAL SETTING
In deciding Pennoyer v. Neff, Justice Field undertook to establish a workable and consistent solution to two long-standing problems in the administration of civil remedies in the United States. The first problem is to provide decent assurance that a defendant in litigation be given reasonable notice of the pendency of proceedings against him. The second is to restrict the judicial remedial power of the respective states to matters of proper local concer.
The issues are put in these terms advisedly. To begin with the premise that the jurisdictional problem is a territorial one may appeal to beg a central question in the conflict of laws. 14 I do not wish to deny the relevance of party intention, public interest, and other factors in assessing the appropriateness of a particular forum. Even with these, a geographical problem usually remains, at least in choice of forum that must be made within the United States. The homogeneity of the federal union, as distinguished from the hetero-geneity of the international community, makes choice of forum among United States courts rather a technical, legal problem than one of major political dimensions. The discussion in these pages is focused on the situation in the United States as a national rather than an international community. It has often been remarked that interstate jurisdictional and choice of laws problems are different from international ones,' 5 but it has not so often been brought to mind why they are different.
The jurisdictional problem in the United States is distinctive because, while the country is socially and economically essentially a unitary state, legally and politically it is in many respects a federation of distinct polities. It is this conjunction of circumstances that is peculiar. Our citizens have a legal right to move from state to state ' " and cultural homogeneity makes it easy and inviting to do so. It is notorious that we are a mobile population, and we have been such since the beginning, as the lives of Franklin, Lincoln, and Stephen Field himself illustrate. Our citizens also have a legal right to project themselves commercially into all parts of the nation, not only to trade but to invest in business, to draw out profits, to buy property, and to become economically domesticated. 1 7 The vastness and richness of the land has made wide-ranging economic adventure attractive. And this, too, has been true since the beginning of our history. Without these social and economic conditions, the federation could have remained an aggregation of social islands whose transactions inter sese, and whose conflicts and jurisdictional problems, would have remained the ancient and essentially simple ones of the merchant traders. (This, together with certain fairly standard problems of domestic relations, is what international conflict of laws was mostly about until the last two decades.)
At the same time, the legal and political pluralism of the American federation is also significant. If this were legally a unitary state, the problems of notice and of territorial jurisdiction would descend to those of venue. 18 In fact, however, the states are autonomous in pre-cisely the respects that are relevant to the problems of judicial jurisdiction. The states are chiefly responsible in our federal union for the promulgation and enforcement of legal rules governing private relations and for the maintenance and operation of civil courts. Autonomy in respect to private law requires rules for choice of law, which in turn can be devised at least in part in terms of choice of forum. In any event, the existence of coordinate tribunals of presumptively equal competence requires rules for choice of forum, and there seems nothing artificial in conceiving of them as rules of jurisdiction and in a real sense territorial.
The peculiar features of the jurisdictional problem in the United States, then, is that our national economic and social unity is conducive to the full panoply of substantive transactions found internally in a unitary state but our political plurality requires a choice of law and jurisdictional rules as among separate sovereigns. The combination would be unendurable as a practical matter but for two facts. First, there are powerful historical and cultural forces that conduce to similarity and reciprocity of state law. Second, the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause embody judicially enforceable limitations on state-court authority. However interpreted from time to time, they make state-court jurisdiction a matter of American municipal law and not a species of demi-international law.
Finally, it may be suggested that the simultaneous existence of economic and social homogeneity with judicial and private-law diversity has tended to magnify small problems and nice distinctions in the American law of jurisdiction and conflicts. If there were economic barriers and if there were social disengagement from state to state, it would have been impossible to solve the problems of jurisdiction and choice of law by the needlepoint of private case-law adjudication. They would have been resolved, if at all, in gross rather than in detail, by legislation rather than by judicial action. This is not to suggest that interstate jurisdiction in the United States presents inconsequential problems. It is to suggest, however, that if the difficulties had been more fundamental they could not have been resolved, as in fact they have been, by such loose judicial improvisation. The problems of notice and of jurisdiction will remain with LJ. 99 (1965); LouisELL & HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDRaAL 421-22 (1962). But it is less of a problem than that which involves the additional circumstance of variations in governing law. us, so long as there is not perfect similarity and reciprocity of law among the states, that is to say, so long as we remain a federation.
A. THE NOTICE PROBLEM
The notice problem long antedated Pennoyer, although it is not clear how far back its roots reach. In the common-law courts and the courts of equity the problem goes back no further than the eighteenth century, for it was only in that period that the default judgment was developed in these courts. 9 In the absence of a pro-19 This development is suggested in the series of statutes permitting use of summons rather than a capias as initial process in common law actions. 12 Geo. I c.29 (1725), "An Act to Prevent Frivolous and Vexatious Arrests," supplemented by 5 Geo. I c.27 (1732), provided: "No person shall be held to special bail upon any process issuing out of any superior court, where the cause of action shall not amount to the sum of ten pounds or upwards ... and [in such cases plaintiff] shall not arrest or cause to be arrested, the body of the defendant or defendants, but shall serve him, her, or them personally within the jurisdiction of the court, with a copy of the process; and if such defendant or defendants shall not appear ... it might be lawful to and for the plaintiff ... to enter a common appearance ... and to proceed thereon, as if such defendant... had entered his, her or their appear-
The Act applied also to actions in inferior courts in which the cause of action was less than 40 shillings. By 19 Geo. III c.70 (1779), the provisions of the earlier act were made applicable to causes involving less than £ 10 whether in the inferior or superior courts. The 1779 Act also provided that where a judgment had been rendered in an inferior court and execution had been unavailing "and ... the person or persons or effects of the defendant or defendants are not to be found within the jurisdiction of such inferior court," the record of judgment in the inferior court might be removed to a superior court at Westminster and writs of execution thereupon issued on the judgment "in the same manner as upon judgments obtained in the said courts at Westminster... " By 43 Geo. ImI cA6 (1803), certain further modifications were introduced and by 51 Geo. III c.124 (1811), the Act of 1725 was applied to causes involving up to £15 and to forms of action in which the original process had been by distringas rather than capias. 7 & 8 Geo. IV c.71 (1827) raised the amount to £20. The Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Win. IV c.39 (1832), made the procedure of summons and default judgment upon failure of appearance applicable in common-law actions generally. Cf. 1 TiD, PRAcricE 109-15 (9th ed. 1828).
On the equity side, it had been provided by 5 Geo. II c.25 (1732), "That if in any suit ... commenced in any court of equity, any defendant or defendants, against whom any Subpoena or other process shall issue, shall not cause his... appearance to be entered ... and an affidavit... shall be made to the satisfaction of such court, that such defendant.., is ... beyond the seas, or ... could not be found so as to be served with such process, and that there is just ground to be- cedure for a default judgment, jurisdiction depended on personal appearance and the question of notice simply did not arise.
Since the Middle Ages, 2° a mechanism for default judgment has existed in the foreign attachment proceedings in local and customary courts. The best known and no doubt most frequently employed procedure of this type was that of the Lord Mayor's Court of London. 21 The London procedure consisted of a garnishment, a pretended effort to serve the defendant personally, a default judgment, and an appropriation to the plaintiff of the garnished debt, subject to the right of the defendant to come in within a year and a day to open up the judgment and litigate the merits. 22 The want of notice in this procedure had occasioned critical comment in the commonlaw courts as early as 1772,23 but it seems nevertheless to have survived well into the nineteenth century. 4 In this country, too, default judgment was an incident of foreign attachment and with it came the problem of notice. The foreign attachment procedure appears to have been used chiefly against an absconding debtor. 25 Under the rules prevailing in the nineteenth century, the defaulted defendant could set aside the attachment by showing that he had not absconded. An appearance to show that he had not absconded required that the defendant, in fact, had knowledge of the suit, which in turn mooted the question of notice, for all practical purposes at least. On the other hand, if the defendant did not appear-for whatever reason-the default would remain final as a practical matter, and the question of notice would not be raised. Either way, therefore, the problem of notice in the foreign attachment cases remained unresolved. The proposition had been frequently reiterated that "not to summon or give notice to a defendant in a suit commenced against him is contrary to the first principles of justice. ' 26 And it had been said that a judgment under such circumstances was null and void, uttered coram non judice, and without force, or validity. 27 Nevertheless, the state courts had been churning out default judgments against unserved absent defendants, no doubt in continuing response to the felt need to provide local creditors and property claimants with final determinations against actually or allegedly departed debtors, partners, and kinfolk. 28 Obviously, notice cannot be given to a defendant who, adventitiously or purposely, is unavailable to receive it. The courts were therefore confronted at an early date with the need either to qualify the proposition that notice is a prerequisite to valid judgment or to leave plaintiffs remediless against defendants who could not be personally served. The latter being inexpedient in the most fundamental sense, the line of appropriate movement lay in qualifying the rule about notice.
Qualification of the notice rule was effected in two formulations. It was said on the one hand that "constructive notice" was the legal equivalent of personal service at least in some kinds of cases. 29 It was also said that personal service was required only in cases where a "personal" judgment was sought, but not in proceedings in rem. 30 26 The first of these qualifications would admit the efficacy of "constructive" notice in cases that might not be regarded as in rem proceedings; the second would admit the efficacy of proceedings identified as in rem without any notice at all, constructive or otherwise. Hence, in the early nineteenth century, while it was recognized that proceedings on constructive notice and proceedings in rem were both somehow exceptions to the rule requiring notice, no logical relationship, and certainly no identity, had been established between them. 31 The notice problem remained in limbo down to the time of [I]n reference to jurisdiction of the person, the statutes of the States have provided for several kinds of service of original process short of actual service on the party to be brought before the court, and the nature and effect of this service... depend altogether upon the effect given to it by the statute.
[T]he judgment of the court, though in form a personal judgment against the defendant, has no effect beyond the property attached in that suit.
We do not deny that there are cases, not partaking of the nature of proceedings in rem... in which the legislature has properly made the jurisdiction to depend on this publication of notice, or on bringing the suits to the notice of the party in some other mode, when he is not within the territorial jurisdiction.
bind the goods attached, and that the judgment has no binding force in personam. ... [T] o bind a defendant personally by a judgment, when he was never personally summoned, nor had notice of the proceedings, would be contrary to the first principles of justice...." (Emphasis added.) 31 Nor could there have been such an identification within the framework of the developed law. By 1800, the English common-law courts could enter judgment on constructive notice in actions for money up to a limited amount and the courts of equity had long had power to enter decrees pro confesso on service by publication. See note 19 supra. Whatever else might be included in the concept "in personam judgment," in this context it clearly included actions for money and proceedings in equity. Since default judgments were allowed in these types of cases, and since these types of cases proceeded on constructive notice, it would have been impossible to regard judgments entered on constructive notice as limited to proceedings in rem. 36 All and all, the law in 1877 with respect to notice was in sorry condition. Its theoretical structure was an incongruity of arching principle and subverting qualifications. In practical application it failed to achieve its expressed objectives.
B. THE PROBLEM OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The protracted confusion in the rules about notice may have contributed to postponing the development of a systematic theory of territorial jurisdiction in Anglo-American law. A theory of territorial jurisdiction would in any event have been premature in England before, say, 1688, or perhaps even 1832. Problems of jurisdiction were the essence of medieval English law and remained signifi- cant until the period of Victorian reform. But until after 1800 it would have been impossible, even if it had been thought appropriate, to disentangle the question of territorial limitations on jurisdiction from those arising out of charter, prerogative, personal privilege, corporate liberty, ancient custom, and the fortuities of rules of pleading, venue, and process. The intricacies of English jurisdictional law of that time resist generalization on any theory except a franchisal one; they seem certainly not reducible to territorial dimension. 37 The English precedents on jurisdiction were therefore of little relevance to American problems of the nineteenth century. Pending further inquiry, it is necessary to speak with considerable diffidence on this subject, but it would appear that, until 1830, there was no developed English common law on what we now call interstate or international jurisdiction. Most of the reported cases concerned jurisdictional relationships within the British Empire-Ireland, Scotland, and the plantations-and not relationships with the equal sovereignties of Europe. As a result, they are parochial, not only in conceptual development but also in legal policy. There is an unmistakable element of imperial supervision running through the cases, and one can perceive a tacit assumption that matters of any consequence ordinarily should and would be brought to Westminster or Whitehall for determination." 8 Moreover, the attitude toward territorial jurisdiction chiefly reflected two concerns, that the English courts not get themselves in a position of entering an unenforceable judgment and that the colonial courts not overreach themselves.
Only a brief statement of the English cases is possible here, but enough I hope to suggest their dimensions. Until Mostyn v. Fabrigas 3 " in 1774, most of the cases involved the question whether defendants served (and, so far as appears, resident) in England were subject to suit in the Court of Chancery over real or personal prop- Nottingham sarcastically adverted to the question whether equity can act in rem, and whether it can only act so, in words that later generations of legal theorists might have heeded: "This is surely only a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the common lawyers; for when you go about to bind the lands, and grant a sequestration to execute a decree, then they readily tell you, that the authority of this court is only to regulate a man's conscience, and ought not to affect the estate, but that this court must agere in personam only; and when, as in this case, you prosecute the person for a fraud, they tell you, you must not intermeddle here, because the fraud, though committed here, concerns lands that lie in Ireland, which makes the jurisdiction local.. This suit was for specific performance of an agreement settling the boundaries between Pennsylvania and Maryland. The chief question of jurisdiction was whether the matter was properly in Chancery rather than the Privy Council. The imperial concerns in the case were, as Hardwicke observed, of "great consequence and importance [,] ... it being for the determination of the right and boundaries of two great provincial governments and three counties; of a nature worthy of judicature of a Roman Senate rather than of a single judge.. . ." As to the question of territorial jurisdiction, he said: "As to the court's not enforcing the execution of their judgment; if they could not at all, I agree, it would be in vain to make a decree; and that the court cannot inforce their own decree in rem, in the present case ... but the party being in England, I could inforce it by process of contempt in personam and sequestration, which is the proper jurisdiction of this court" Cf. a suit would lie in Chancery where the defendant was before the court, so long as there seemed to be some good reason to assert jurisdiction and relief could effectively be administered, either in the form of a decree for money or by coercing the defendant to act by sequestering his local property.
In Mostyn v. Fabrigas and some similar cases, Lord Mansfield sustained actions in England for torts committed elsewhere, in each instance against defendants subjected to process in England. Some of the actions were ones which under English law were "local" and it was urged on this account and others that they should have been dismissed, but jurisdiction was affirmed. 45 The defendant's presence in England seems to have been less a reason for asserting jurisdiction than an obviation of a reason why it should not be asserted; it could hardly be said that personal presence was the basis for jurisdiction. The fact is that each of the cases involved public law implications, and indeed the assertion of jurisdiction was justified on that ground. 48
45 Mostyn v. Fabrigas was an action for trespass for assault and false imprisonment by a resident of Minorca against the governor of the island, who had determined that plaintiff was a troublemaker and summarily packed him off to Spain. Mansfield refers to unreported cases in the same vein: "At the last sittings there were two actions brought by Armenian merchants, for assaults and trespasses in the East Indies.... I have had some actions before me, rather going further than these transitory actions; that is going to cases which in England would be local actions: I remember one, I think it was an action brought against Captain Gambier, who by order of Admiral Boscawen had pulled down the houses of some suders who supplied the navy and sailors with spiritous liquors.... I overruled the objecton upon this principle, namely, that the reparation here was personal, and for damages, and that otherwise there would be a failure of justice; for it was upon the coast of Nova Scotia, where there were no regular Courts of Judicature.... I quoted a case of an injury of that sort in the East Indies, where even in a Court of Equity Lord Hardwicke had directed satisfaction to be made in damages.... "I recollect another cause . . . for destroying fishing huts upon the Labrador coast. After the Treaty of Paris, the Canadians early in the season erected huts for fishing; and by that means got an advantage, by beginning earlier, of the fishermen who came from England.... However the admiral from general principles of policy ordered these huts to be destroyed.... There are no Local Courts among the Esquimaux Indians upon that part of the Labrador coast; and therefore whatever injury had been done there by any of the King's officers would have been altogether without redress, if the objection of locality would have held." 1 Cowp. at 180-81, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1031-32.
Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (KJ3. 1774), was an action to recover export duties collected by the defendant as tax collector on the island of Grenada, duties which plaintiff contended were illegally imposed. No question was raised as to jurisdiction.
4 6 "[T]hough the charge brought against him is for a civil injury, yet it is likewise of a criminal nature; because it is an abuse of the authority delegated to him by the King's letters patent, under the Great Seal.... So that emphatically the A later decision, Doulson v. Matthews, 47 refused to entertain an action for trespass to a dwelling house in Canada on the ground that the Court of Common Pleas "may try actions here which are in their nature transitory, though arising out of a transaction abroad, but not such as are in their nature local." It is hard to say whether the apparently private character of the dispute was significant and, therefore, whether or not Mostyn v. Fabrigas was being repudiated in whole or in part. It is clear nevertheless that the objections to actions arising abroad were framed in terms of the court's domestic jurisdictional limitations, so that the cases would have little cogency in situations, as in the United States, where the domestic jurisdiction of a state court was not the focus of concern. These two groups of cases are reducible to the principle that personal service is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for the exercise of jurisdiction. A similar theme may underlie a group of cases at the end of the eighteenth century which concerned the validity of judgments rendered ex parte on posted notice in island plantation courts. Cranstown v. Johnston 48 was a suit to restrain colonial proceedings in execution of such a judgment; Buchanan v. Rucker 49 was an action to collect such a judgment in England; and Cavan v. SwtewartO was an action for money due that was defended on the ground of prior payment, defendant having been garnished in a colonial court at the suit of a creditor of the present plaintiff. These cases curiously present a modern textbook trilogy of recognition problems: stay of foreign proceedings, local affirmative enforcement, local defensive recognition. They were all decided adversely to the colonial judgments, the first on the ground of lack of notice, 5 ' governor must be tried in England, to see whether he has exercised the authority delegated to him by the letters patent legally and properly; or whether he has abused it in violation of the laws of England, and the trust so reposed in him: ' the other two on the ground that the defendant was not shown to have been present in the colony. 52 The rule applied in the last three cases was, of course, inconsistent with the practice of foreign attachment that still prevailed in the Mayor's Court of London. 53 Recognition of this may have influenced decision in what appears to be the next English decision, Douglas v. Forrest in 1828." That was an action on a Scottish default judgment rendered on notice by "proclamation at the marketcross of Edinburgh" against a defendant who was a native Scot but who had departed overseas. The point was pressed in argument that if the judgment was invalid, so were London foreign attachment proceedings.r 5 The court enforced the Scottish judgment but in doctrine so cautious that it is difficult to evaluate. 5 6 In the last English decision before 1834, the Court of King's Bench unbent perhaps a little more in recognizing a foreign judgment, allowing an action on a judgment rendered in Mauritius for a tort committed there in which the proceedings had been commenced after defendant had left the island.ST 62 "By persons absent from the island [in the Tobago statute] must necessarily be understood persons who have been present and within the jurisdiction, so as to have been subject to the process of the Court; but it can never be applied to a person who for aught appears never was present within or subject to the jurisdiction.' Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East at 194, 103 Eng. Rep. at 547. "It is perfectly clear on every principle of justice, that you must either prove that the party was summoned, or at least that he was once on the island:' Cavan v. Stewart, 
1828). C5
Counsel for the plaintiff said: "Nor is there anything in the practice repugnant to the law of England; for under process of foreign attachment in the city of London, if a creditor issued a summons against a debtor to which there is a return of nihil, goods belonging to the debtor in the hands of a third person may be attached; and though DeGray, C. J., in Fisher v. Lane ... expressed his disapprobation of the practice, yet it has always prevailed... ." 4 Bing. at 693-94, 130 Eng. Rep. at 936. 5 6 'We confine our judgment to a case where the party owed allegiance to the country in which the judgment was so given against him, from being born in it, and by the laws of which country his property was, at the time those judgments were given, protected. The debts were contracted in the country in which the judgments were given, whilst the debtor resided there. ' Such was the course of English precedent over a period of 150 years. Three things are clear about these cases: They were dominated by considerations of domestic jurisdiction and procedure, they cannot be reduced to a set of general principles of jurisdiction, and none of them described jurisdiction in the terms "in personam," "in rem," or "quasi in rem," or in equivalent English terms.
This posture of English law seems to have much importance in the development of the American law of jurisdiction in the early years of the Republic. After the Revolution, the problem of territorial jurisdiction among the states was very real and very delicate, and was hardly less so after the adoption of the Constitution with its vital but mysterious Full Faith and Credit Clause. 58 Yet in the resolution of these problems the American courts had received no helpful common-law heritage. The crucial fact is that American jurisdictional concepts were largely fashioned by Story out of Continental sources and particularly the work of the Dutch jurist Huber. 59 The lines of this transmission have apparently not been worked out in detail, but the transmission is not surprising in view of the dearth of English sources and the receptivity of the colonies to Continental political and legal philosophy in the eighteenth century.
At all events, it is clear that no later than the early reported American decisions, a distinction was recognized between jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in personam 60 in form generally similar however, was given, that by the law of the colony, in the case of a person formerly resident in the island, absenting himself, and not leaving any attorney upon whom process in a suit might be served, the Procurator-General or his deputy was bound to take care of interests of such absent party. ....
[I]t must be presumed that he would do whatever was necessary in the discharge of that public duty; and we cannot take upon ourselves to say that the law is so contrary to natural justice as to render the judgment void in a case where the process was so served. It is quite true that Story did not invent the dichotomy of jurisdiction in personam and jurisdiction in rem. It is also true, as Professor Nadelmann has said, that Story borrowed from Huber the idea of the exclusivity of sovereign authority, and the correlative idea of comity. 5 But Story did two things that Huber had not done and these are of such significance that Story deserves the attribution for a good deal.
In the first place, Story worked significant changes in the formulation of Huber's propositions. These changes were achieved by elaborating implications from Huber, but it is the elaboration that is important. Huber had put his propositions this way:" 4
(1) [A] court created within and for a particular territory is bounded in the exercise of its powers by the limits of such territory....
[N]o sovereignty can extend its process beyond its territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions.
And in his treatise on conflict of laws, Story combined the generality of Huber with particularities of his own and said this: 6
[E]very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. The direct consequence of this rule is, that the laws of every state affect, and bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its territory; and all persons, who are resident within it, whether natural born subjects, or aliens....
[N]o state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein, whether they are natural born subjects, or others. This is a natural consequence of the first proposition.
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of these embellishments:
1. A mild statement about territorial sovereignty of states is converted into a rule limiting judicial jurisdiction.
2. The proposition that persons within the territory are subject to jursidiction is expanded to include property within the jurisdiction.
3. The proposition is advanced that the jurisdiction over persons and property is exclusive, which does not follow necessarily from Huber's propositions. The weasel word "directly" is added in anticipation of possible difficulties.
In addition to his expansion of Huber's propositions, and equally important, Story was instrumental in transforming Continental political theory into legal rules operative in a federal union. The Continental theorists were after all just that: They were building intellectual constructs for critical enlightenment, not administering the law in its intricate routine. Story, by the force of his prose and his learning, suggested that Huber's concepts were to be used to decide concrete cases and were consonant with the law as it stood.
In the light of the then existing decisions, this was no mean achievement. The state of English precedent has already been canvassed. 67 Some of those precedents, notably Buchanan v. Rucker, denied the validity of a garnishment judgment rendered in the place where the property was situated. 6 Some, notably Penn v. Lord Baltimore, had announced the validity of a decree in Chancery that determined interests in property situated outside the territorial limits of the court's process. 69 And some had enforced foreign in personam judgments that had been rendered against defendants who had been neither present nor personally served. 7° American precedents can easily be found that are not inconsistent with Story, 71 but that proves little because most of the cases are consistent with a variety of jurisdictional theories. Aside from Story's own opinion in Picquet v. Swan, there appears to be no case before 1834 that contains the rhetoric of exclusive jurisdiction found in his treatise. And the American decisions taken as a whole were as much at variance with Story's postulates as were the English.
72
In the light of the decided cases and of the wide range of problems to which jurisdictional rules had been adapted, Story's system reflected neither decided authority nor critical analysis. Taken literally, his system permits disposition of the trivial situations where all persons and all objects of property pertinent to the case are within one territorial precinct, or where none of them is. 73 "directly" affecting persons or property and "indirectly" doing so. 74 If this is the correct interpretation, then the system is question-begging. These difficulties will be explored presently. Finally, it should be noted that Story was not indifferent to the problem of notice. 75 He did not, however, indicate how it would be possible to give notice to a person absent from the jurisdiction consistent with the rule that "no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits. '76 Since the key notice problems had arisen in regard to persons absent from the jurisdiction, Story's system left the question of notice suspended in irresolution.
II. THE RATIONALE OF PENNOYER
It will have to await further study to say to what extent Story's propositions were influential in the interval between his first edition and the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff. 77 There is no question, however, that Story influenced Pennoyer v. Neff itself. The basic organization, the intellectual structure, and much of the language of Justice Field's opinion is taken straight from Story, with the consequence that all the logical and practical difficulties implicit in Story's system were translated wholesale into constitutional law. Moreover, fateful and astonishing, Justice Field justified adoption of Story in part because he saw it as a solution to the notice problem. That dismal inspiration has begotten difficulty ever since.
The Often as Pennoyer has been rehashed, the main features of the argument are worth some examination. First, it is interesting to observe the premise on which Story's principles of sovereignty were accepted. The principles, said Justice Field, are "principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and property. The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent.... But, except as restrained and limited by [the Constitution], they possess and exercise the power of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them." ' If this premise were fully acmain body of argument. Story's principles are reiterated at 722, and Darcy v. Ketcham is cited again and discussed at length at 729-30.
One apparent oddity of the case is that the dissenting opinion of Justice Hunt says, at 743, that Galpin v. Page, note 36 supra, "is cited in hostility to the views I have expressed." In fact, this case is not cited in Field's opinion.
These two circumstances suggest that Field's published opinion is a rewrite, the first part of which survived from a draft in which he made short work of the case but which had to be revised to meet a vigorous dissent. 79 95 US. at 719-22. The action was one of ejectment by which Neff sought to recover a tract of Oregon land formerly his. Pennoyer's defense was that he held title by virtue of a sheriff's deed given at an execution sale upon an earlier judgment against Neff in favor of one Mitchell. (Mitchell's action against Neff had been for recovery of fees rendered as an attorney.) At issue therefore was the validity of the execution sale and the judgment it undertook to enforce.
There had been no personal service in the action of Mitchell v. Neff, Neff having been out of the state. There had been newspaper publication of notice of the suit, a default judgment, and then the execution sale. Neff contended the judgment was invalid because of a failure to comply with the Oregon statutes specifying the procedure for publication. It does not appear that he contended the procedure was invalid in any event because it did not provide for "seizure" of the property before entry of judgment; this seems to have been a suggestion advanced by the Court itself. One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants ...and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. The other principle . . . follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.
The difficulty with these propositions has been intimated,1 7 but some amplification is appropriate. The first principle can be taken as a legal and political truism, that in a modem independent political regime the lawgiving and law-enforcing agencies of that regime, and not of some other, regulate the affairs of person and property in the territory ruled by that regime. They are not regulated, that is, by the Holy Roman Emperor, the law of God as uttered by anointed kings, or the prescriptions of the United Nations. Alternatively, the principle can be taken as a statement of positivist legal theory, that the law of a particular place is the emanation of an identifiable political organization and not a logical extension or local emiment created by the Constitution." Ibid. Powers such as that of making war and peace, maintaining the army and navy, providing a coinage, building an interstate navigational and rail system, and disposing of the western lands constituting nine-tenths of the national geographic area. Justice Field failed to mention that the Constitution also withdrew certain powers from the states and by this negative means tended to unify the nation: the powers to exclude citizens of sister states or to deny them equal privileges and immunities, to re-evaluate sister-state judgments, and, following the civil disturbance lately concluded, to deny any person due process or equal protection of the laws. It is difficult to imagine what diminution of state powers would have sufficed to change Justice Field's premise; it was surely an ideological fixation rather than an attempted statement of legal fact. variation of natural or universal law. The principle can also be taken as a statement of the political attitude which sovereign states manifest toward their relations with other sovereign states, one of jealous concern for a local monopoly of political power and legal authority. s8 There are doubtless other ways in which the Story principles can be understood that are equally true and enlightening. But the one context in which the principles are either not true or not enlightening is precisely that in which they have been typically invoked, that is, in the adjudication of civil controversies having multistate elements. If no multistate elements are involved, because either all elements are in a particular state or none of them is, the formulation of a jurisdictional principle is purely a scholastic exercise. Since in such a case there is no problem in reality, no boundaries of reality exist to confine conceptual imagination within contours of fact, policy, and definition that real legal problems entail.
On the other hand, when adjudication of civil controversies does involve multistate elements, it is fatuous to think of any court having exclusive jurisdiction of anything. The jurisdictional problem exists precisely because there is no single tribunal that has exclusive jurisdiction in the territorial sense. This is quite apparent in cases where persons who are within the territorial jurisdiction litigate claims to property outside the territory, such as the suit for specific performance of land located elsewhere. s9 It is equally apparent in cases determining claims to property within the territorial jurisdiction that are asserted by persons who are outside the territory.1 0 Two other situations are believed to have characteristics such that they can be placed in a category of exclusive jurisdiction. It is this belief that appears to be responsible for perpetuation of the Story principles as restated in Pennoyer. The first of these situations is the ordinary action for money damages, in which it is thought that jurisdiction relates only to the person of the defendant because the essence of the proceeding concerns his personal legal duty and obligation. An action for damages does indeed concern the personal legal duty and obligation of the defendant, but it does so in no different sense than does, say, an action for specific performance or for an injunction against waste. The elements of the obligation to be enforced are quite independent of the kind of remedy sought to be obtained. Indeed, in all cases in theory, and in many cases in fact, the remedy for a given breach of obligation can be either damages or specific relief. Since there is no analytical difference between the obligation that gives rise to a claim for compensatory damages and that which gives rise to injunctive relief, the obligation cannot be used to differentiate the jurisdictional concepts applicable to the respective situations. Accordingly, the damage action cannot be distinguished from specific performance or other types of injunctive relief as a uniquely in personam proceeding.
The obligation involved in a damage action, moreover, is of practical interest because it is the predicate for a determination of a property interest. As every plaintiff's lawyer knows, an in personam judgment is of operative significance only because and to the extent that it is the initial stage of a compensatory transfer of defendant's property to the plaintiff. When this is done by rendition of a judgment in state A followed by execution and sale of defendant's land in state A, it is perfectly obvious that the proceedings taken as a whole concern both defendant and his property. It should be no less obvious when the judgment of state A is reduced to judgment in state B and defendant's property in that state is then forfeited to the plaintiff. 91 Hence, it is not possible to isolate the money judgment for damages into a special category of truly exclusive in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. If the judgment is entitled to 91 By force of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is legally obligatory in state B that the judgment of state A be taken as conclusive, reduced to a local judgment, and enforced. This procedure is somewhat more complicated than execution proceedings against property in state A would have been and the complications may have serious practical dimensions. But neither of these circumstances detracts from the fact that the judgment of state A was the basis for a conclusive alteration of property interests in state B. Hence, it is not true to say that the judgment in state A merely affects the defendant personally and does not involve his property in state B.
Attachment proceedings, though brought to enforce in personam obligations, obviously involve claims to property. An ordinary money judgment cum execution may be thought of as a delayed and complicated form of attachment. recognition in state B, the state A proceedings that led to the judgment affect property in state B in no more restricted sense than a state A decree of specific performance would affect the property in state B.
The other type of case with multistate elements that is thought nevertheless to involve exclusive jurisdiction is the so-called true in rem proceeding. In this kind of proceeding, an object of property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is identified as the subject of jurisdiction. Upon specified procedures, such as publication or issuance of a monition, interests in the property are established "against all the world." 92 But this kind of proceeding also involves people as well as the object of property. "The whole world" that is said to be bound by such proceedings after all consists of individual persons, even though for res judicata purposes they are lumped together as a large-size crowd. To foreclose the interests and claims of an indeterminate number of persons is operationally no different than to do so vis-a'-vis one or more specified persons, as in the case of foreign attachments. That an indeterminate absentee's claims are foreclosed upon lesser notice than those of a determinate absentee does not alter the fact that the absentee, whoever and wherever he may be, is having his rights to the property adjudicated. That being so, the exercise of jurisdiction in such a proceeding is not without legal consequence to persons elsewhere and should not be thought of as somehow being in rem in a way different from a garnishment proceeding against an absentee. In this light, it is impossible satisfactorily to maintain the idea that exclusive jurisdiction can be exercised in any class of cases with multistate elements. Focusing attention on the person of the defendant before the court does not render a proceeding purely in personam, if the defendant has property elsewhere that will have its legal status affected by the proceeding. Focusing attention on an object of property before the court does not render a proceeding purely in rem, if there are persons elsewhere whose legal interest in the property will be affected by the proceeding. The categorical structure of proceedings in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem collapses. Upon its collapse all that remains are the facts that in cases with multistate elements, sometimes the persons concerned are within the court's territorial jurisdiction but the property concerned is not, and sometimes the reverse is true, and there is in such situations a problem of determining whether one or more coordinate courts can appropriately award a civil remedy in the circumstances 4 This is but a return to the starting point of the inquiry.
The third step of Field's opinion was a review of the previously decided cases for the purpose of showing their consistency with the Story system. This may be passed with the statement that the demonstration withstands critical analysis no better than Story's own effort to do so. 5 94Perhaps a word more may be said about the wisdom and utility of trying to distinguish between "directly" affecting persons or property elsewhere and doing so "indirectly." Both Story and Field attempted this distinction, Field with this statement: "But as contracts made in one State may be enforceable only in another State, and property may be held by non-residents, the exercise of jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it. To any influence exerted in this way.., no objection can justly be taken; whilst any direct exertion of authority upon them . . . would be deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated. Surely it is odd to think of a decree compelling a transfer of land as "indirectly" affecting the land and the extinction of a person's valid interest to property as only "indirectly" affecting his personal rights. It is also difficult to see how these processes differ from an execution sale and an imposition of judgment liability, respectively. And to say that the difference lies in the fact that the former are valid but the latter invalid assumes the answer to the question being addressed.
95 Compare text and footnotes supra, at notes 67-72.
The fourth step was new and, all things considered, perhaps the most unfortunate of all. This was the proposition that where jurisdiction was founded on the presence of property within the state, it was essential to "seize" the property prior to judgment. This proposition appears to have been wholly novel, for the existing authority seemed to require only that the writ of attachment be "levied" prior to judgment. A levy on personal property required actual or "constructive" seizure but a levy on real property was apparently achieved by the sheriff's filing papers at the courthouse. 96 Justice Field's argument in support of the seizure requirement was twofold, of which the first branch is the important one. 97 Field argued that seizure was essential as a matter of notice. After alluding to the dangers inherent in rendering money judgments without notice, 98 he explained why seizure should be required in cases where jurisdiction was based on the presence of property: 99 9 6See Drake, op. cit. supra note 21, at § 231 (1st ed. 1854): "The requisites of an attachment of real estate are generally determined by statute. Where, however, that is not the case, the rule which has obtained in Maine and Massachusetts would probably be received and applied-that it is not necessary for the officer to go upon the land, or into its vicinity, or see it, or do any other act than make return upon the writ that he had attached it." The same statement is repeated in § 236 of Drake's third edition published in 1866.
It is worthwhile noting that it was on this point-the requirement of seizurethat the Court divided in Pennoyer v. Neff. The dissent by Justice Hunt argued that seizure was not required because the procedures for exercising jurisdiction by attachment and garnishment "are exclusively within the judgment of the legislature, and.., the judiciary cannot review them." 95 U.S. at 747. So far from disagreeing with Field on the theory of jurisdiction, Justice Hunt was remorselessly more doctrinaire. 97 The second branch of the argument was that unless there were a seizure in advance of judgment, it could not be determined whether the judgment was an effort to determine interests in local property, which would be valid, or an effort to render a judgment of personal liability without personal service, which would be invalid. "[I]t would . . . make the validity of the proceedings and judgment depend upon the question whether, before the levy of execution, the defendant had or had not disposed of the property. . . . This doctrine would introduce a new element of uncertainty in judicial proceedings." 96 U.S. at 728. The argument is not particularly convincing but, in any event, is of no direct relevance to the formulation of the jurisdictional principles themselves. 98 95 US. at 726: "If, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte against non-residents and absent parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested, could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud and oppression."
09 Id. at 727.
Substituted service by publication ... may be sufficient to inform the parties . .. where the property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act. The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, by person or by agent; and it proceeds on the theory that its seizure will inform him.... However, he said, publication was ineffectual to found jurisdiction in personam because: 100
Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State.... Publication of process or notice cannot create any greater obligation upon the non-resident to appear. These propositions were of major significance. The equation of seizure with notice was tendered as an answer to the objection that it was unfair to condemn an absentee's property without notice. This meant, for however long the Court adhered to this proposition, that absentees whose property was being appropriated in in rem proceedings were "deemed" notified by the seizure, which, in fact, would not necessarily have that effect, or by the publication that accompanied the seizure. Thus, the defendant was relegated to chance notice: As Justice Field noted, "mere publication of process ... in the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested."' 0 1 In addition, affirmance of the proposition that "process cannot run into another state" precluded the possibility that conscientious states might try to provide better notice than publication. Not only was notice to absentees not required; in legal contemplation it could not even be given.
Justice Field then went on to assert that the limitations on statecourt jurisdiction were matters within the purview of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This rested on better ground in the precedents than is sometimes assumed and in any event can be passed as a now accepted and workable legal premise. The last step in Justice Field's opinion was his attempt to deal with cases that were not apparently reconcilable with the propositions he had so uncompromisingly advanced. "To prevent any misapprehension," he said, "we do not mean to assert" that a state might not, first, conclusively determine the status of its citizens vis-i-vis persons outside the state, referring in particular to divorce proceedings, 0 3 and, second, require a foreign corporation or a "partnership or association" to appoint a local agent for service of process. 04 It is necessary only to suggest why these exceptions are baffling: the absent spouse and the absent business association are affected by the proceedings he specified in no lesser way than proceedings which he had earlier said could not affect absentees. The only coherent explanation of these inconsistencies is that Justice Field was simply freezing the procedural status quo.
Appraised by contemporary critical standards for assessing logic and policy in judicial decision, Pennoyer v. Neff arouses dismay and even despair. It is an example par excellence of what Karl Llewellyn called the Formal Style in juristic reasoning. 1 05 That it 402-07 (3d ed. 1874), had emphatically pronounced that the question of jurisdiction was a matter of due process, citing good authority in support. That the Fourteenth Amendment was not effective at the time of the entry of the state-court judgment is not relevant to the validity of the argument. 104 95 US. at 735. Justice Field did not notice that there was a material difference in the legal basis on which a state could compel a foreign corporation to appoint a local agent and the basis on which it might lay down a similar requirement regarding partnerships and associations. A foreign corporation could be excluded from local entry under Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (1839), and with that leverage compelled to appoint an agent, Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (1856). But a partnership or association was regarded as an aggregate of citizens and as such could not be excluded from a state because of the prohibitions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. If Justice Field had in mind some other legal basis on which a state could compel appointment of an agent, he did not intimate it.
He also said explicitly that in default of appointment of an agent, the state could validly provide for service on a state official instead and thereupon enter judgment "binding upon the non-residents both within and without the State." 95 U.S. at 735. How this reconciled with the proposition that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory," id. at 722, he did not explain. survives at all is some kind of a monument to American legal thought.
III. PENNOYER iN AscE;NDANcE AND DEcLINm
Pennoyer v. Neff dominated the American law of jurisdiction for nearly three-quarters of a century down to the decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 1 6 It is accordingly regarded as "the law" in that period, although it had a less secure place in particular application than it did in general theory. There are in any event three aspects to the Pennoyer regime that can be separately identified. First, Pennoyer's principle limiting the reach of state-court process proved highly inconvenient in automobile accident cases and in actions against corporations. The adjustment to these inconveniences culminated in an abandonment of the principle. Second, its rule that seizure is notice proved to be an engine of injustice and has been repudiated. Third, Pennoyer's categorical differentiation between actions in personam and actions in rem proved impossible to maintain with consistency and predictability. These developments did not appear at the same time: The automobile cases came to a head in the 1920's and the corporation cases in the 1940's; the notice problem was not pressed hard until the Mullane case in 1950107 and has not yet made its full impression; 0 8 and the confusion arising out of the categorical structure has only recently reached critical proportions, largely as a result of the changes in the other two aspects of Pennoyer.
The difficulties with Pennoyer's first aspect, the territorial limitation on service of process in damages actions, is a tale so often told that it can be foreshortened. With respect to corporations, the cue was taken from Justice Field's concluding dictum that the states could require foreign corporations doing local business to appoint an agent for service of process and could provide that if they failed to do so, effective substituted service could be made on an officer of the state.1 0 9 The states that had no statutes of this sort soon enacted them. The pattern being fixed, the disputed question was whether, in cases where the corporation had not appointed an agent, the local activity of the corporation was sufficient to sustain substituted service of process. 10 For a long time the inquiry was whether the local activity was sufficient so that it could be said that the corporation was "present" in the state, in deference to Pennoyer's major theoretical premise that presence was required. Judge Learned Hand's exposure of this fiction"" was approved in International Shoe" 2 and the question of amenability to service was recast in terms of "minimum contacts.""
There is a sidelight in this development that is worth noting. Under Pennoyer, the theory was that where the corporation failed to appoint an agent, the state official designated to receive substituted service was the agent of the corporation. (This was essential under the theory because otherwise the corporation would not have been served within the territorial boundaries of the state.) Taking this literally, it would follow that a default judgment entered after service on the state official would be valid, he being the corporation's agent and acting on its behalf, even if he threw the process into his 110 At one point, the logic by which Justice Field had approved substituted service on foreign corporations reappeared to create difficulties. The theory of substituted service on foreign corporations was that since the state could refuse to recognize the local existence of a foreign corporation, it could enforce the less rigorous measure of requiring actual or constructive appointment of an agent as a condition of local entry. After Pennoyer had been decided, it was established that a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce had a constitutional privilege under the Commerce Clause to carry out that commerce locally despite the state's opposition. See Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914) . This undermined the theoretical basis for substituted service of process on foreign corporations engaged exclusively in interstate business. But the gap was soon closed by the proposition that local activity, even though immune from state restriction, constituted "presence" and therefore subjected the corporation to service of process under the rule in Pennoyer. This was one of the improvisations that at the same time modernized the law and preserved Pennoyer from earlier repudiation. wastebasket. Substantially this kind of a problem did arise, and the Supreme Court of the time had no difficulty in sustaining the judgment even though the corporation apparently had no notice of the suit against it. 114 This rule is obsolete now but it is indicative of the difficulties into which Pennoyer could lead.
The automobile accident problem-the visiting motorist who strikes and then retreats home before he can be served-required similar manipulation of the Pennoyer system. The agency device was again employed to escape the territorial restrictions on service of process, the idea being that the visiting motorist appointed the state's secretary of state as agent for process in return for being allowed to drive on the local roads. 15 It, too, was taken literally in certain states, which provided for service on the secretary of state but did not provide for giving notice of the suit to the absent motorist. In a decision whose result seems entirely sound but which is unattainable within the Pennoyer system, the Court held that mail notice to the absentee, or its equivalent, was required by due process." 16 These two lines of expansion of state-court jurisdiction merged following International Shoe. They now sustain the widely enacted "long arm" statutes, which provide for service of process against absentees who have committed a local tort, entered a local contract, own local property, and sundry variations."
7 Unless the 1958 decision in Hanson v. Denckla" s augurs a retreat, which seems most unlikely, the theoretical structure of the rules for service of process in damage actions seems securely established in International Shoe's minimum-contacts concept. The twenty years since its decision have been occupied by the pointillist process of locating particular cases on one side of the line or the other. Some states retain the formality of local service on the secretary of state, and some courts, still transfixed by Pennoyer's inhibitions on interstate service of process, have thought this important." With these qualifications and aberrations, the rule now amounts to this: a state can subject a person to its jurisdiction by service of process anywhere in the country, so long as the litigation has substantial local elements. What remains of the aspect of Pennoyer that precluded extraterritorial service is difficult to see, although some authorities with more tenacity than persuasiveness still profess the new rule to be only a qualification of the old.
The second problem in the Pennoyer system was the matter of notice in in rem proceedings. Not long after Pennoyer was decided, it was held that due process required no more than seizure or an equivalent manifestation of jurisdictional initiative. Accordingly, upon seizure or its equivalent it was unnecessary to make other efforts to give notice of the proceedings to persons concernedY. 20 The rule was applied in condemnation and statutory quiet-tide proceedings,' 2 ' and a number of cases involved statutory proceedings for the forfeiture of abandoned property. 2 In one context and another there was unshaken adherence to the rule that a court had jurisdiction if the "thing" was seized and that it was up to the absentee to find out about the proceedings. This attitude was strengthened by the fact that no provision for notice could have been required consistent with Pennoyer, for this might have called for extraterritorial service of process.
The decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 23 abruptly intruded on this aspect of Pennoyer v. Neff. That case involved a New York statutory procedure for the settling of a trustee's accounts concerning common trust funds held in its custody. The procedure was substantially identical to accountings for ordinary trustees, executors, and administrators, and resulted in a decree approving the accounts and exonerating the trustee from claims of liability in connection with the trust. It clears the trust corpus and it also clears the trustee, a kind of declaratory judgment certifying the rectitude of the trustee's conduct.
The question in Mullane was whether the proceedings were con-clusive on beneficiaries of the trust who had not been served or otherwise notified of the proceedings. It was argued in support of the statute that the proceeding concerned a trust res, that the proceeding was therefore in rem, and that the beneficiaries were accordingly bound regardless of notice. Per contra it was argued that the proceedings concerned the personal obligation of the trustee to the beneficiaries, that the proceeding was therefore in personam, and that service of notice was necessary before the benficiaries could be concluded. It was held that a reasonable effort to give actual notice to the beneficiaries had to be made, at least to the extent of mailing notice to the beneficiaries whose addresses were known. The Court acknowledged that a balance had to be struck between giving notice to parties interested and providing a device for winding up trustee accounts, and observed that it had "not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be uti 
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The rule was applied more recently in Schroeder v. City of New York .
9
It is surely not reading too much into these cases to say that the Supreme Court will hold that no proceeding concludes a person who can be identified and located with reasonable effort unless that person is notified of the proceeding by means no less dignified than regular mail. In practical context this amounts to a requirement of service of process on all persons except those who have disappeared for some time or are deliberately hiding. The vast stores of information about people that are readily available in our bureaucratized society make it hard to lose someone-the post office, telephone companies, utilities, and credit bureaus usually know or can find them. In historical perspective, transmittal of process by the modern post office is at least as trustworthy as it was by the eighteenthcentury sheriff; in comparative perspective, it may be recalled that European civil process is routinely delivered by mail. 130 As to the absconders, there may still be some utility in the idea of service by publication, although it seems to me there are more attractive ways of meeting that problem.3' 8 When the rule is made clear, as there is every indication it will be, that service of notice is a general requirement, the presence of property in the jurisdiction loses the vestiges of its special jurisdictional significance. Process, delivered either by the sheriff or by the postman, must issue whether the property is real or personal, whether it is seized or not, and whether the interested parties are found locally or elsewhere. The property-the land, the trust fund, the bank account-no longer has significance as a "thing" over which the court has jurisdiction, but is merely an event that is the proper occasion for exercise of local jurisdiction, like an automobile accident or a claim for attorney's fees.' 3 2 I think we have now about reached this stage. That being so, there is nothing left by which to differentiate proceedings in personam and those in rem, and the keystone of Pennoyer's conceptual structure is gone.
The Pennoyer conceptual structure has indeed long since proved inadequate to hold the problem cases in predictable and useful neither Maryland nor North Carolina. It could not be garnished in North Carolina, so it could be said, because Harris was out of the state, and therefore beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and therefore not amenable to North Carolina garnishment process. At the same time, it could not be garnished in Maryland because garnishment procedure contemplates that "the plaintiff [i.e., Epstein] is really, in such a proceeding, a representative of the creditor of the garnishee [i.e., Balk], and therefore if such creditor himself [Balk] had the right to commence suit to recover the debt... his representative has the same right... .,,1 To recognize Epstein as a plaintiff is therefore to constitute him Balk's representative for the occasion. But the appointment of a personal representative empowered to manage and consume the principal's property is tantamount to the direct exercise of authority and jurisdiction over the principal himself. Since Balk, the principal, was not within the jurisdiction of the Maryland court, so it could be argued under Penvoyer, the Maryland proceedings were void.
In the line of analysis just suggested, the situation in Harris v. Balk would lie wholly outside the Pennoyer system, a conceptual system that purports to be inclusive, and would be one in which no court could enter a valid judgment. This analysis need not be accepted, of course. The key points are that it is as plausible as the one the Court did adopt and that it cannot be rejected by any argument derived from Pennoyer itself.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy presented the same difficulty. In that case a man named Gould had a paid-up insurance policy that had become due. Gould had a daughter, Mrs. Dunlevy, to whom the policy allegedly had been assigned. A creditor of Mrs. Dunlevy brought garnishment proceedings in Pennsylvania against the insurance company, seeking to reach the policy proceeds and joining Gould as an additional party. The company admitted the sum was due, alleged that Gould claimed the policy proceeds, paid the money into court, and requested that Mrs. Dunlevy and Gould be interpleaded. Mrs. Dunlevy defaulted, judgment was entered in favor of Gould, and the money was paid to him. Mrs. Dunlevy in the meantime moved to California, sued the insurance company there on the policy, and recovered judgment. The company pleaded that the Pennsylvania proceeding determined the interests of Gould and Mrs. Dunlevy in the fund, but this defense was rejected.
The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the interpleader proceeding "was an attempt to bring about a final and conclusive adjudication of her personal rights, not merely to discover property and apply it to debts.... The established general rule is that any personal judgment a state court may render against one who ... is not... served with process in its borders.., is void, because the court had no jurisdiction over his person."' 138 This was assuredly an analysis permitted by Pennoyer's rules. It is not clear, however, why the analysis would not have been equally applicable in Harris v. Balk: That proceeding did not merely "discover" Banc's property in Maryland and "apply it to debts"; the Maryland proceeding determined in Balk's absence that he owed a debt to Epstein and it is impossible to see why that was not "an attempt to bring about a final and conclusive adjudication of [Balk's] personal rights" to the extent of $180.' s9 On the other hand, the interpleader suit in Dunlevy just as easily could have been analyzed as a proceeding to determine the interests in a specific res, i.e., the insurance proceeds. That "thing" was within the territory of Pennsylvania, because the debtor-insurance company was there, and the fund had been taken into the custody by its officials.' 4 " The adjudication of the conflicting claims to the fund would be in substance a quiet-tide proceeding, which under Pennoyer could be held-and held only?-in the state where the "thing" was located. 4 ' 18 241 U.S. at 521, 522-23. 130 The fact that Balks liability to Epstein in excess of $180 was left open by the Maryland judgment does not vitiate the fact that his liability was conclusively determined up to that amount. If the amount Harris owed Balk had been, say, $500, and the amount claimed by Epstein was only $300 (as it was in fact), the garnisment judgment would have determined Balk's "personal rights" as exhaustively as an in personam judgment. The piecemeal character of the adjudication could not have altered the character of Balk's legal relationship to Harris.
140A year later, the Court so characterized a bank account in a sequestration proceeding: "Indebtedness due from a resident to a non-resident ... is property within the state. .. . The only essentials to the exercise of the state's power are presence of the res within its borders, its seizure at the commencement of the proceedings, and the opportunity of the owner to be heard." Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271, 272 (1917) .
141 See Arndt v. Griggs, supra note 121. The recent decision in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), I think has the effect of repudiating the Dunlevy decision. The Western Union case was a suit in Pennsylvania by the state to escheat sums held by the telegraph company representing unclaimed money orders. Pennsylvania claimed the amounts of money orders
The Pennoyer system, in addition to its other defects, is thus a revolving door as applied in quasi in rem situations; where you come out in analyzing the jurisdictional problem depends on where you decide to stop. Its inadequacy as a general theory can be summarized as follows: whereas an object is "property" because people have legal claims to it, and any legal claim for material redress is a claim to be compensated in property, Pennoyer requires the impossibility of thinking of property without an owner and compensation without payment.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW THEORY Ever since International Shoe, Pennoyer v. Neff has been eligible for oblivion. Chief Justice Traynor plainly suggested that the step be taken, and that all jurisdictional problems be approached as ones of the existence of minimum contacts between the forum and the transaction in litigation. 142 Surely this is not difficult to conceive in the present posture of the law.
1. The "long-arm" statutes are settling into familiar application in multistate tort and contract cases. If drafted to embrace multiparty litigation-disastrous accidents, claims for impleader in manufacturer's liability cases, and the like-they would close a gap that has long existed in the remedial system of the United States. 43 It seems bought in that state but not collected by the senders, wherever they might have been. The state of New York claimed the same funds on the ground they were "in" New York, the company's corporate domicile and principal headquarters. Other states made similar claims, along the lines of those in Texas v. New Jersey, see text supra, at note 13. The Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania could not proceed against the company in a suit in which New York was not a party, because a person in the defendant's situation "is deprived of due process of law if he is compelled to relinquish [the property] without assurance that he will not be held liable again in another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who is not bound by the first judgment." 368 U.S. at 75. Although the Court limited its discussion to cases where jurisdiction was asserted in rem and perhaps to escheat cases, it is difficult to see why the same principle would not be held applicable in a situation like Dunlevy, especially since International Shoe and Mullane have removed any obstacles to giving notice to the absent claimants.
In the Western Union case, an original proceeding in the Supreme Court was necessary because the rival claimants were states and not amenable to the process of courts of other states. That is no barrier where the claimants are individuals or corporations. See generally LouisEi. & HAZARD, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 429-31. clear that legislation along these lines would be sustained by International Shoe as buttressed by Mullane.
14 4 This would supply the jurisdictional basis for the damage actions that are the general run of litigation.
2. The presence of a res-a tract of land, a fund-is of no peculiar jurisdictional significance but is rather the transactional event that provides a legitimate basis for plenary jurisdiction pursuant to the minimum-contacts rule. The process is issued to nonresidents in such cases in order to comply with Mullane's notice requirement. That process, because it issues from a state having minimum contacts with the litigated transaction, has potency in virtue of International Shoe to permit entry of whatever judgment is necessary to determine the controversy, without regard to limitations formerly associated with in rem proceedings.' 4 5 3. The attachment cases are appropriately limited by the minimum-contacts rule to situations where either the obligation secured by the attachment arose from a transaction with local elements, 14 in which case there is plenary jurisdiction because of minimum contacts anyway, or where the plaintiff can show that attachment is probably necessary if he is to realize on his claim, 47 in which case attachment is employed for its proper use as a security device. Since these two categories include practically all the cases where attachment is presently employed, only minor practical change will result from this revised conceptualization. Serious inconvenience regarding the place of trial occasioned by attachment as a security device can be avoided or mitigated by dismissal conditioned upon a bond being posted by defendant to meet judgment liability should it ultimately be established. 4 ' In this scheme of things, there are two defects that inhibit acceptance of a general minimum-contacts theory of jurisdiction. The first is that the vagueness of the minimum-contacts general principle can make jurisdictional litigation uncertain at the trial level and frequent at the appellate level. The second is that it provides no solution to the problem of the claimant who cannot be located or identified-he being among those constituting "all the world" that were concluded by in rem proceedings.
The first defect can be resolved by the technique of particularization-arbitrary particularization if you will-within the general minimum-contacts framework. 149 This technique is manifested legislatively in the "long-arm" statutes, though they could be greatly improved upon. 1 0 It is also manifested judicially in the two recent cases which are the pretext for this essay.
In Texas v. New Jersey, 5 ' Mr. Justice Black considered the prospect of applying the general minimum-contacts principle to numerous and various state escheat claims, and found it unmanageable: 52 The "contacts" test as applied in this field is not really a workable test at all-it is simply a phrase suggesting that this Court should examine the circumstances surrounding each particular item of escheatable property on its own peculiar facts and then try to make a difficult, often quite subjective, decision as to which State's claim to those pennies or dollars seems stronger than another's.
He then announced a series of specific rules: escheat of debts owed to persons for whom a last address is known shall be to the state where that address is located; escheat of debts owed to persons for whom there is no record of address shall be to the state of the debtor's corporate domicile; and a variation was announced to cover 149 It seems infinitely preferable to have a sensible general theory with arbitrary categorial subsystems than, as in the Pennoyer system, an unsensible general system with arbitrary categorial subsystems. In the former situation, the subsystems can be criticized and corrected intelligently and without using fictions. cases where a particular state had no escheat law. What is interesting is not the particular rules themselves but their particularity. 1 3 A similar technique could reduce the minimum-contacts principle to like particularity in identified needful areas of jurisdictional law. 5 4
The other case manifesting a useful technique of particularization is the Citibank case. 55 That case involved issues far afield of the jurisdiction of state courts, but the manner in which the Supreme Court cautiously handled the question of remedy is relevant to the present discussion. The government had brought suit in the Southern District of New York to recover income taxes allegedly due from Omar, S. A., a Uruguayan corporation, and joined the First National City Bank as a party. On a showing that Omar was liquidating and withdrawing its assets from the United States, the government obtained a temporary injunction restraining the bank from dispersing Omar's account maintained at the bank's Montevideo branch. The bank appealed the temporary injunction and won reversal in the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court in turn reversed, reinstating the injunction.
The Government summarized its main point in this way:""" The District Court had authority to enjoin respondent, over whom it had personal jurisdiction, from participating in the dissipation of assets belonging to an absent taxpayer pending the service of valid process on the taxpayer.
The bank argued in more traditional terms: 57 jurisdiction to decide the merits would be improper in the absence of minimum contacts with the transaction sued on.' 62 This analysis accommodates the attachment cases within the structure of the minimum-contacts principle. Damage actions, specific performance suits, condemnation, and interpleader types of cases have already been accommodated. This brings us to the problem of the persons who cannot be located or identified.
There are differences between the problem of the person who can be identified but not located and that of the person who cannot even be identified. The person who can be identified though not located has two characteristics that are different from the one who is unidentified. First, the problem of notifying him turns on the degree of effort that must be expended in seeking him. Second, he is a person against whom it may be practical to obtain a compensatory judgment. On the other hand, the unidentified person-"unknown heirs" are the prototype-may be nonexistent, so that efforts to find him will necessarily prove futile. Moreover, the unidentified person is never in practical terms the target of a compensatory claim because it is impossible to identify "his" property and thus to realize redress. As to him, the only litigating objective can be to foreclose claims he may have against others.
With these differences in mind, it is not difficult to put the identified but unlocated person into place in the minimum-contacts framework. The limiting case here would be where, in an action for damages or other compensatory relief, reasonable effort is made to deliver notice but notice is in fact not delivered to the defendant. Can a valid judgment for compensatory relief be granted in such a case? This depends on whether the condition of rendering a valid judgment under the Due Process Clause is defined as the giving of notice or the making a reasonable effort to give notice. If the former, then the plaintiff is helpless to obtain compensation-for example, from the defendant's insurance company-unless he can actually deliver notice to the defendant. The Supreme Court has never gone beyond holding that due process requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard and that reasonable effort to give notice of the hearing sufficiently affords that opportunity. But the Supreme Court has never passed on the precise question raised, although many lower courts have. The problem has arisen recurrently under the automo-1 62 See note 148 supra.
[1965 bile "long-arm" statutes. Most courts have ducked the issue by readhag-sometimes by straining to read-the local state statute to require actual notice.1 3 Those courts that have faced the issue all appear to have held that failure of actual delivery of notice does not preclude valid judgment, so long as a reasonable and technically punctilious effort has been made, i.e., there has been compliance with a statutory procedure that is itself reasonable. 6 4 And this seems a correct analysis of the due process requirement as established by the Supreme Court.
This brings us to the last stage of the analysis, the problem of the person who cannot be identified. By hypothesis such a person cannot be given notice of the proceedings despite reasonable efforts to identify and locate him within the state and without. Yet there are necessities that require proceedings that can close the door conclusively on all future disputation. "Parties cannot thus, by their seclusion from the means of information, claim exemption from the laws that control human affairs, and set up a right to open up all the transactions of the past. The world must move on .... , 1165 The trust accounting in Mullane was such a case, decedents' estates are such cases, and so are bankruptcy, quiet-tide, and many other proceedings conventionally denominated in rem proceedings.
The traditional device of foreclosing the absentee is notice by publication. Indeed, achievement of the objective of finality is the only real justification for service by publication, and the tradition and the need no doubt will keep the ceremony of service by publication a part of the law of jurisdiction. But determination of the unidentifiable absentee's interest can be rested on ground more secure in concept and policy.
The more appropriate approach, it seems to me, is the notion of bar by statute of limitation. This notion has pervaded the law of jurisdiction to an extent perhaps not fully appreciated. The fact is that the prototype foreign attachment proceeding, that of the Lord Mayor's Court of London, was not conclusive on the absentee debtor until the expiration of a year and a day after judgment.°0 The same was true also of the Maryland statute in Harris v. Balk. 1 7 Most probate statutes fix a period for claims,' 618 and so do the bankruptcy laws. 169 Escheat and abandoned property forfeitures are predicated on the bar of time, as are many statutory quiet-tide procedures. Many procedures that are not explicitly founded on the principle of limitation are nevertheless consonant with it-"absconding debtors" and "unknown heirs," the typical personages, do not become such overnight.
On this analysis, the problem of serving notice on unknown absentee disappears. The claims of those who cannot be found are concluded instead by an official signal-such as the commencement of proceedings-that time is running, and the imposition of bar when it has done so. The limiting case would be that of an absentee who ultimately proved to have been an incompetent: Could the bar of time validly be raised to his claims? The Supreme Court has indicated it can, 170 and there is no reason to suppose a retreat from this view. That being so, the minimum-contacts principle, particularized in needful special areas, attended by a notice requirement, and supplemented by systems of time bar, provides an adequate general theory of state-court jurisdiction. We can release Pennoyer's grip on our minds. 166 See Locke, op. cit. supra note 21, at 19. 167 See 198 U.S. at 227. 168 Cf. Stevens v. Torregano, 192 Ca. App.2d 105 (1961).
